The complexity of visual stimuli plays an important role in many cognitive phenomena, including attention, engagement, memorability, time perception and aesthetic evaluation. Despite its importance, complexity is poorly understood and ironically, previous models of image complexity have been quite complex. There have been many attempts to find handcrafted features that explain complexity, but these features are usually dataset specific, and hence fail to generalise. On the other hand, more recent work has employed deep neural networks to predict complexity, but these models remain difficult to interpret, and do not guide a theoretical understanding of the problem. Here we propose to model complexity using segment-based representations of images. We use state-of-the-art segmentation models, SAM and FC-CLIP, to quantify the number of segments at multiple granularities, and the number of classes in an image respectively. We find that complexity is well-explained by a simple linear model with these two features across six diverse image-sets of naturalistic scene and art images. This suggests that the complexity of images can be surprisingly simple.

Much of human knowledge is organized into sophisticated systems that are often called intuitive theories. We propose that intuitive theories are mentally repre- sented in a logical language, and that the subjective complexity of a theory is determined by the length of its representation in this language. This complexity measure helps to explain how theories are learned from relational data, and how they support inductive inferences about unobserved relations. We describe two experiments that test our approach, and show that it provides a better account of human learning and reasoning than an approach developed by Goodman [1]. What is a theory, and what makes one theory better than another?

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the $complexity$ of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the $representational \ level$, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the $computational \ level$, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

Much of human knowledge is organized into sophisticated systems that are often called intuitive theories. We propose that intuitive theories are mentally represented in a logical language, and that the subjective complexity of a theory is determined by the length of its representation in this language. This complexity measure helps to explain how theories are learned from relational data, and how they support inductive inferences about unobserved relations. We describe two experiments that test our approach, and show that it provides a better account of human learning and reasoning than an approach developed by Goodman [1]. What is a theory, and what makes one theory better than another?

Much of human knowledge is organized into sophisticated systems that are often called intuitive theories. We propose that intuitive theories are mentally represented in a logical language, and that the subjective complexity of a theory is determined by the length of its representation in this language. This complexity measure helps to explain how theories are learned from relational data, and how they support inductive inferences about unobserved relations. We describe two experiments that test our approach, and show that it provides a better account of human learning and reasoning than an approach developed by Goodman [1]. What is a theory, and what makes one theory better than another?

Much of human knowledge is organized into sophisticated systems that are often called intuitive theories. We propose that intuitive theories are mentally represented ina logical language, and that the subjective complexity of a theory is determined by the length of its representation in this language. This complexity measure helps to explain how theories are learned from relational data, and how they support inductive inferences about unobserved relations. We describe two experiments that test our approach, and show that it provides a better account of human learning and reasoning than an approach developed by Goodman [1]. What is a theory, and what makes one theory better than another?